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I. INTRODUCTION

The state secrets privilege has received a tremendous amount
of scholarly attention in the United States in the last decade. The
focus started early in President Bush’s second term with the
emergence of a pattern of the administration seeking dismissals of
lawsuits during the pleadings stage, even when the suits dealt with
allegations of gross human rights violations and last resort attempts
1
of gravely injured individuals to vindicate their rights.
† Professor of Law, Western New England University School of Law. J.D.
Columbia Law School, A.B. Stanford University. I owe thanks to Matthew H.
Charity and Adam Tomkins for reviewing earlier drafts and discussing the ideas in
this Essay with me, to law librarian Renee Rastorfer for her valuable research
assistance, and to the board of the William Mitchell Law Review for inviting me to
write this Essay. I also thank participants at the Conference on Secrecy, National
Security, and the Vindication of Constitutional Law, hosted by the International
Association of Constitutional Law Research Group on Constitutional Responses to
Terrorism in December 2011, and participants at my February 2012 talk at the
Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, whose questions
and suggestions helped strengthen this Essay. Portions of the analysis in this Essay
are drawn from a previous work: Sudha Setty, Litigating Secrets: Comparative
Perspectives on the State Secrets Privilege, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 201 (2009).
1. Press Release, Office of U.S. Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Kennedy
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Congress has, in the last few years, toyed with the idea of
attempting to rein in the executive’s increasing reliance on the
state secrets privilege as a means of escaping the possibility of
accountability: It debated the State Secrets Protection Act of 2008
in response to Bush Administration invocations of the privilege in
high-profile cases in which plaintiffs alleged extraordinary
rendition, torture, and prolonged detention by the U.S.
2
government and its allies. Although this proposed legislation
lapsed after the election of President Barack Obama, Congress
3
reintroduced nearly identical reform legislation in February 2009
after the Obama Administration appeared to adopt the Bush
Administration’s stance in favor of a broad and sweeping
4
The proposed
invocation and application of the privilege.
legislation again lost momentum after the Obama Administration
released a new policy for the Department of Justice in September
2009 that mandated a more rigorous internal administrative review
5
prior to invoking the state secrets privilege.
Introduces State Secrets Protection Act (Jan. 22, 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted), available at 2008 WLNR 1256008; e.g., Amanda Frost, The State Secrets
Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931, 1939 (2007) (“The
Bush Administration has raised the privilege in twenty-eight percent more cases
per year than in the previous decade, and has sought dismissal in ninety-two
percent more cases per year than in the previous decade.”); William G. Weaver &
Robert M. Pallitto, State Secrets and Executive Power, 120 POL. SCI. Q. 85, 100 (2005)
(claiming that the Bush Administration is using the state secrets privilege with
“offhanded abandon”); see also William G. Weaver & Danielle Escontrias, Origins of
the State Secrets Privilege, SELECTED WORKS OF WILLIAM G. WEAVER 3–4 (Feb. 10,
2008), http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context
=william_weaver (describing the state secrets privilege and how important of a tool
it is for the executive branch); cf. Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of
National Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1252 (2007) (claiming that
a survey of the invocation of the state secrets privilege in the post-Reynolds era
indicates that “recent assertions of the privilege are not different in kind from the
practice of other administrations”).
2. 154 CONG. REC. S198-201 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 2008) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy on the State Secrets Protection Act).
3. See Press Release, Office of U.S. Sen. Patrick Leahy, Leahy, Specter,
Feingold, Kennedy Introduce State Secrets Legislation (Feb. 11, 2009), available at
http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/press_releases/release/?id=81a196e2-692e498d-bf80-96ba81e252b5.
4. Editorial, Continuity of the Wrong Kind, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2009, at A30
(disagreeing with the Obama Administration’s decision to continue the Bush
Administration invocations of the state secrets privilege to try to have litigation
against the government dismissed at the pleadings stage).
5. See Memorandum from Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., on Policies and
Procedures Governing Invocation of the State Secrets Privilege to Heads of Exec.
Dep’ts & Agencies (Sept. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Holder Memorandum], available
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However, in the two years since the new policy took effect, it
appears as though this internal review process has resulted in little
difference between the Bush and Obama Administrations with
regard to the invocation of the privilege at the pleadings stage in
cases that allege serious constitutional violations and human rights
6
abuses.
One high-profile case, that of Binyam Mohamed and other
plaintiffs claiming that they had been subject to extraordinary
rendition, torture, and prolonged detention, illustrates three
important dynamics: continuity in approach between the Bush and
Obama Administrations; the deferential attitude of the reviewing
court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which, although
appalled by allegations of government abuse, used a rigid,
formalistic analysis that denied Mohamed the right to proceed with
his case; and the distancing in the approach of U.S. courts from
those in England that were confronted with the same plaintiff and
7
set of facts.
8
The use of judicial formalism in Mohamed illustrates the
judiciary’s internal struggle to determine its appropriate role when
at http://legaltimes.typepad.com/files/ag-memo-re-state-secrets-dated-09-22-09
.pdf (establishing layers of internal review within the Department of Justice and
including a new executive branch policy to report to Congress any invocations of
the state secrets privilege).
6. See Sudha Setty, Litigating Secrets: Comparative Perspectives on the State Secrets
Privilege, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 201, 257–58 (2009) (identifying the continuity between
the Bush and Obama Administrations in their approach to the state secrets
privilege).
7. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1130 (N.D.
Cal. 2008).
8. Judicial formalism can be conceived in numerous ways, but I use it here
to refer to a judicial methodology that gives primacy to narrow rule-following
rather than consideration of the role of the courts to act in a way that is infused
with morality when necessary to preserve individual rights. See Richard H. Pildes,
Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 612–16 (1999) (describing one form of
formalism as “apurposive rule-following”). Other commentators have described
the constraints of judicial formalism as “a commitment to, and therefore also a
belief in the possibility of, a method of legal justification that can be clearly
contrasted to open-ended disputes about the basic terms of social life, disputes
that people call ideological, philosophical, or visionary.” Roberto M. Unger, The
Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563, 564 (1983). On the other
hand, Justice Antonin Scalia has supported the use of a formal approach to
maximize stability and credibility in the Supreme Court’s decision-making,
opining that a “discretion-conferring approach is ill suited . . . to a legal system in
which the supreme court can review only an insignificant proportion of the
decided cases.” See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1175, 1178 (1989).
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confronted with constitutional rights questions during a time of
9
war or perceived emergency —a dilemma that has been confronted
10
by courts in constitutional democracies around the world. The
Mohamed litigation offers evidence of a disturbing trend of U.S.
courts retreating to formalistic reasoning to extend unwarranted
11
deference to the executive branch in security-related contexts. In
this Essay, I limit my analysis to the recent jurisprudence
surrounding the state secrets privilege. I place the formalist
decision-making of the Mohamed court in juxtaposition with other
nations’ jurisprudence—including the English courts that dealt
9. In Minimalism at War, Cass Sunstein analyzes three categories of judicial
decision-making in wartime: national security maximalism, in which courts defer
broadly to executive branch claims of Article II authority without weighing the cost
in terms of constitutional liberty interests; liberty maximalism, in which courts
maintain a peacetime approach to the protection of constitutional liberty
interests; and minimalism, in which courts use constitutional avoidance theory,
statutory authority, and a narrow approach to creating precedent to weigh security
and liberty interests. See Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV.
47, 50–52 (2004). Sunstein views national security maximalism as inadequately
accounting for fundamental liberty principles and liberty maximalism as
unrealistic and unwarranted given the need for greater government intrusion into
liberties during wartime, concluding that minimalism is the most appropriate
judicial approach during wartime. Id. I suggest that Mohamed and similar
decisions should be conceived of differently, reflecting a formal and narrow
adherence to procedures and rules as a means of enabling deference to executive
secrecy claims and avoiding real engagement in the civil liberties dilemma
underlying the case.
10. See generally Aharon Barak, The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, and
the Fight Against Terrorism, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 125, 125–26 (2003) (discussing the
obligation of the Israeli judiciary to remain vigilant against incursions on the rule
of law); Aileen Kavanagh, Constitutionalism, Counterterrorism and the Courts: Changes
in the British Constitutional Landscape, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 172, 173–74 (2011)
(discussing the extent to which U.K. courts have engaged in constitutionalism as
part of their decision-making after the passage of the Human Rights Act of 1998);
Mrinal Satish & Aparna Chandra, Of Maternal State and Minimalist Judiciary: The
Indian Supreme Court’s Approach to Terror-Related Adjudication, 21 NAT’L L. SCH. INDIA
REV. 51, 59–67 (2009) (arguing that the Indian Supreme Court has been
inconsistent in its approach to terrorism-related cases and other cases involving
fundamental rights).
11. The type of national security judicial formalism I describe is evident in a
number of recent cases. E.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009)
(dismissing suit seeking damages for extraordinary rendition and torture upon a
finding that constitutional and international law obligations did not apply); AlAulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing suit seeking
injunctive relief for the listing of plaintiff’s son on the U.S. targeted killings list
based on standing and political question grounds); El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp.
2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff’d, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007) (dismissing suit seeking
damages for extraordinary rendition and torture upon upholding the
government’s invocation of the state secrets privilege).
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with a separate lawsuit brought by Mohamed there. In this type of
case, the United States appears to be moving away from the
flexible, rule-of-law-oriented approach that courts in the United
Kingdom and Israel take. Instead, U.S. courts are echoing the
formalistic rigidity that the Indian Supreme Court uses in cases
involving state invocations of secrecy.
Given the Obama Administration’s continuing aggressive
invocation of the state secrets privilege and the judiciary’s seeming
unwillingness to step into its countermajoritarian role to defend
the ability of individuals to litigate their basic human and civil
rights, I conclude that Congress should re-introduce state secrets
reform legislation that could infuse the litigation process with some
level of procedural and substantive fairness. At the same time, I
urge courts to step away from the type of judicial formalism that
they have rejected to some extent in other national security
12
contexts, such as habeas corpus rights for detainees. U.S. courts
would do well to heed the lessons of countries like India, the
United Kingdom, and Israel in terms of understanding the
ramifications of a judiciary unwilling to engage in decision-making
on these issues.
II. THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S INVOCATION OF THE STATE
SECRETS PRIVILEGE
In his prefatory language to the Obama Administration’s 2009
state secrets policy, Attorney General Holder emphasizes that the
policy’s goals include
provid[ing] greater accountability and reliability in the
invocation of the state secrets privilege in litigation . . .
[and] strengthen[ing] public confidence that the U.S.
government will invoke the privilege in court only when
genuine and significant harm to national defense or
foreign relations is at stake and only to the extent
13
necessary to safeguard those interests.
The policy further includes important limitations on the
Department of Justice’s use of the privilege, including a
12. Decisions like Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507 (2004), Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), and Boumediene v. Bush,
553 U.S. 723 (2008) reflect the Supreme Court’s willingness to engage in a level of
rights-protective reasoning that preserves the rule of law in the context of habeas
corpus rights.
13. Holder Memorandum, supra note 5, at 1.
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prohibition against using the privilege to:
(i) [C]onceal violations of the law, inefficiency, or
administrative error; (ii) prevent embarrassment to a
person, organization, or agency of the United States
government; (iii) restrain competition; or (iv) prevent or
delay the release of information the release of which
would not reasonably be expected to cause significant
14
harm to national security.
The rest of the policy establishes the layers of review within the
Department of Justice with regard to satisfying the procedural
15
requirements for invoking and defending the privilege.
To many observers, this policy signaled the possibility of an
important change from the perceived overuse and abuse of the
16
privilege under the Bush Administration. However, the Obama
Administration’s invocation of the privilege has been as aggressive
as that of President Bush, as the case of Binyam Mohamed
exemplifies.
In Mohamed, the Northern District of California dismissed a
suit brought by five detainees against a Boeing subsidiary allegedly
involved in the transportation of the detainees for government17
The allegations of Binyam
directed rendition and torture.
Mohamed, a British resident, are similar to those of others
subjected to extraordinary rendition.
Mohamed traveled to
Afghanistan in 2001 to, according to his account, escape a lifestyle
18
According to U.S.
that led to drug addiction in England.
authorities, Mohamed trained with the Taliban in Afghanistan to
prepare for an attack within the United States. Mohamed was
14. Holder Memorandum, supra note 5, at 2.
15. These procedural requirements are laid out in the first U.S. case to deal
specifically with the state secrets privilege. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1,
6–8, 10–11 (1953). For an in-depth account of the Reynolds case, see LOUIS FISHER,
IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE
REYNOLDS CASE (2006).
16. Some commentators expressed skepticism of the 2009 policy even at the
time it was issued. See Charlie Savage, Justice Dept. to Limit Use of State Secrets
Privilege, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2009, at A16 (“Congress must still enact legislation
that provides consistent standards and procedures for courts to use when
considering state secrets claims. Our constitutional system requires meaningful,
independent judicial review of governmental secrecy claims.” (quoting Rep.
Jerrold Nadler) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
17. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1130 (N.D.
Cal. 2008).
18. Profile: Binyam Mohamed, BBC NEWS (Feb. 23, 2009, 16:00 GMT),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7870387.stm.
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arrested in Pakistan in 2002 as he attempted to return to the
United Kingdom; he claims that he was detained and tortured in
Pakistan, then transported to Morocco where he was held
19
incommunicado and tortured for the next eighteen months.
Mohamed alleges that he was then moved to Afghanistan and was
ultimately transferred to the U.S. detention center at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, where he was held from September 2004 until February
20
Mohamed and others alleging they were subjected to
2009.
extraordinary rendition by the United States filed suit in 2007
against Jeppesen Dataplan, the Boeing subsidiary that operated the
airplanes that transported the detainees to various detention
21
centers around the world.
In granting the government’s motion to dismiss, the district
court cited much of the same reasoning that other U.S. courts
22
dealing with the privilege had relied upon, including the need to
dismiss the suit because the subject matter at issue—the
government’s extraordinary rendition program—was itself a state
secret that, if revealed, could jeopardize national security
23
The plaintiffs appealed this decision while the Bush
interests.
Administration was still in power. Oral argument on the appeal
was scheduled for shortly after the Obama Administration took
over, and many expected that the new administration would not
contest the appeal or would do so on limited grounds. Instead, the
Obama Administration followed with the litigation strategy begun
by the Bush Administration—one that sought affirmation of the
24
A Ninth Circuit panel reversed,
dismissal of Mohamed’s case.
adhering closely to the narrow standard first articulated by the U.S.
Supreme Court in United States v. Reynolds in 1953 and rejecting the
government’s claims that the suit needed to be dismissed outright
19. Id. Mohamed alleges that he was beaten, scalded, and suffered cuts on
his genitals with a scalpel by his captors. Id.
20. Id.
21. Amended Complaint at 1–6, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563
F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 07–2798).
22. E.g., El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 535 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff’d, 479
F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007) (dismissing based on the state secrets privilege a suit in
which plaintiff alleged extraordinary rendition and torture).
23. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1134–36
(N.D. Cal. 2008).
24. At that point, representatives of the Obama Administration reiterated the
Bush Administration argument that the suit was properly dismissed based on the
invocation of the state secrets privilege. See John Schwartz, Obama Backs Off a
Reversal on Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2009, at A12.
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25

based on its subject matter.
Although this decision offered an opportunity for President
Obama to align his administration’s position with his campaign
26
promises to reform the use of the state secrets privilege, the
administration appealed to the Ninth Circuit to hear the case en
banc, where it prevailed in having Mohamed’s suit dismissed.
III. UNPACKING THE FORMALISM IN MOHAMED
In September 2010, the Ninth Circuit dismissed en banc the
plaintiffs’ suit in a formalistic opinion that failed to acknowledge
the reality of the gross human rights abuses that the plaintiffs
suffered at the hands of the U.S. government. The court dismissed
the plaintiffs’ suit while expressing concern about the lack of
27
remedy available to the plaintiffs; the majority opinion went so far
as to suggest the remote possibility of compensation from the
Obama Administration or a congressionally fashioned remedy to
28
compensate for the grievous harm suffered by the plaintiffs. The
dissent, on the other hand, used a rule of law analysis to critique
the majority, emphasizing the role of the court in providing a
venue for those subjected to government abuse to seek redress and
emphasizing the judiciary’s responsibility to facilitate government
29
accountability.
The majority’s reasoning begins with an obligatory recitation
of the standard set forth for evaluating an invocation of the state
secrets privilege: ascertaining whether the procedural requirements
of invocation have been met; determining whether the information
is privileged; and, assuming the privilege claim is successful,
30
The court dispenses
determining how to resolve the matter.
25. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992, 997, 1009 (9th Cir.
2009). The Ninth Circuit further clarified that documents considered “classified”
for Freedom of Information Act purposes are not necessarily “secret” for purposes
of the state secrets privilege and that the government had the burden of
establishing the need for genuine secrecy. Id. at 1006–08.
26. Editorial, Too Many ‘State Secrets Privilege’ Cases, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2009,
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/14/opinion/la-ed-secrets14-2009dec14
(noting that Obama’s defense of the Bush Administration position in Mohamed was
in contrast to his campaign promises regarding the state secrets privilege).
27. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1092–93 (9th Cir.
2010) (en banc).
28. Id. at 1091–92.
29. Id. at 1101 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 1080 (majority opinion) (relying on the test articulated in United
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1953)).
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relatively quickly with the first two questions, finding that the
procedural requirements have been met and holding that the
information is privileged based on government affidavits and the
31
court’s examination of some of the classified evidence.
The majority then dwells on the question of how to resolve the
matter. The court begins with its understanding of its obligation to
dismiss a suit if it appears that privileged information will be
32
The majority finds that even if
necessary to litigate the case.
plaintiffs are able to prove their case relying solely on publicly
available evidence, dismissal of the suit is still necessary because of
the difficulty that Jeppesen Dataplan would have in defending itself
33
It is
against the suit without implicating privileged material.
particularly ironic that the majority opinion, while claiming to have
struggled with the tension between human rights and security
concerns, ultimately retreats to rigid and formalist reasoning that
turns on its concern that a company that was allegedly complicit in
the torture of innocent civilians is able to adequately defend itself
34
in a civil matter.
Instead of asserting the role of the courts as a venue in which
those alleging human rights violations have the opportunity of
access to justice, the majority opinion abdicates its responsibility as
a standard bearer for the rule of law and a bulwark against
government abuses. Instead, it offers several platitudes as to its
own actions and the possibility of government accountability and
redress stemming from the other branches of government: first,
that the administration has complied with its own 2009 policy with
regard to intra-executive review of claims of the state secrets
35
privilege; second, that the executive branch may decide someday
to compensate the victims of the extraordinary rendition program,
as was done decades after the rendition and internment of
36
individuals of Japanese descent during World War II; third, that
31. Id. at 1085–86.
32. Id. at 1083.
33. Id. at 1089–90.
34. The veracity of the plaintiffs’ claims about Jeppesen Dataplan’s complicity
in the torture is not factored into the majority opinion, a point raised by the
dissent. See id. at 1095 n.5 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (noting that former Jeppesen
Dataplan employees understood that their extraordinary rendition flights resulted
in the torture of detainees, but that the company continued to run the flights
because they “paid very well”).
35. Id. at 1090.
36. Id. at 1091. It is remarkable that the majority stretched its reasoning to
consider the reparations awarded to Japanese internees during World War II as a
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Congress could initiate an investigation into government abuses;
fourth, that Congress could enact private bills to compensate the
plaintiffs; and fifth, that Congress could take up state secrets
37
reform. These potential avenues for compensation seem unlikely
at best, and noting the executive branch’s adherence to its own
procedures or the possibility of future state secrets reform offers
only cold comfort to plaintiffs.
The dissent by Judge Hawkins focuses largely on procedural
matters, but also offers a critique of the narrowness of the majority
opinion. In a section dealing with the appropriate standard of
review of a Rule 12 dismissal, Judge Hawkins notes the veracity of
Mohamed’s claims of Jeppesen Dataplan’s role in rendition and
torture and remarks that the majority’s failure to give weight to
38
these claims undermines an appropriate Rule 12 analysis. The
dissent’s conclusion offers a direct rule-of-law-oriented critique:
first, Judge Hawkins observes that the majority has “disregard[ed]
the concept of checks and balances” and abdicated its responsibility
by suggesting that the executive or Congress should act to provide
compensation; second, the dissent characterizes the majority’s
suggestion regarding reparations as “elevat[ing] the impractical to
the point of absurdity”; and finally, the dissent notes the horror of
what was suffered by the plaintiffs and the need to preserve an
39
avenue for them to seek redress in the courts if possible.
The en banc decision in Mohamed, with its abdication of the
court’s traditional rule of law responsibilities, makes clear that
40
Congress should step in and clarify the state secrets privilege. The
potentially appropriate model of compensation for extraordinary rendition and
torture. First, those reparations came decades after the harm to the internees and
only after a national soul-searching was undertaken as to how such poor national
security policy was validated by all branches of government and the public.
Second, hearkening back to the World War II internment can only evoke
comparisons to the deferential formalism of Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944), which most modern commentators view as a profound failure of the
judiciary to apply a rule of law analysis to a case balancing security interests with
human rights.
37. Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1091–92.
38. Id. at 1095–96.
39. Id. at 1101.
40. It is clearly not in the interest of the executive branch to initiate any
tinkering with the state secrets privilege, since the current application tends to
grant most government requests for dismissal or non-discovery. See Editorial,
Secrets and Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/02
/opinion/02sat1.html?ref=editorials (noting that the proposed congressional
measures were necessary given the courts’ reflexive dismissal of cases involving
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current application of the state secrets privilege raises numerous
questions that require clarification: when the government can
invoke the privilege and what can be protected from disclosure;
whether it is appropriate to grant a motion to dismiss based on a
state secrets claim at the initial pleadings stage; what the
appropriate relief for a valid claim of the privilege is; and how
deeply the court must examine the government’s claim. Congress’s
refusal to enact reform thus far, in combination with the judiciary’s
inaction, has led to a de facto ceding of almost all decision-making
41
control on this issue to the executive branch.
IV. FORMALISM IN THE COMPARATIVE CONTEXT
The Reynolds Court, in establishing the standard for evaluating
a claim of privilege, drew from English precedent from the World
War II era. The English version of the state secrets privilege,
known as public interest immunity, has evolved in a different
direction than that of the United States since that time; this
dynamic is illustrated most dramatically in the English judiciary’s
contemporaneous treatment of Binyam Mohamed’s lawsuit in the
English courts.
To further contextualize the analysis of judicial formalism in
the application of the privilege, I also look at how Israel and
India—countries facing significant national security challenges that
rely heavily on U.K. precedent—deal with questions of state secrets
42
and the role of the courts during litigation.
A. England
English courts generally afford high levels of deference to
43
government officials claiming public interest immunity, although
the 2009 and 2010 decisions in the case of Binyam Mohamed
national security issues).
41. See Aziz Rana, Who Decides on Security? 4, 35 (Cornell Law Sch., Faculty
Working Paper No. 87, 2011), available at http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi
/viewcontent.cgi?article=1090&context=clsops_papers.
42. India and Israel are useful comparators as functioning democracies with
constitutionally mandated separation of powers and serious ongoing national
security threats, and, like the United States in the context of the state secrets
privilege, both countries derive some legal processes from the United Kingdom.
43. See Air Canada v. Sec’y of State for Trade, [1983] 2 A.C. 394 at 395 (Eng.)
(stating that when a government official has proffered a good faith affidavit as to
the need for the public interest immunity to apply, the court should give absolute
deference).
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illustrate a potential shift in this trend. The Divisional Court in
that case forewent its previously typical deference and engaged in
the complexities of the case in a way that took into account the
larger objectives and role of the judiciary and the need to maintain
an avenue for government accountability for alleged human rights
abuses.
The backdrop of the English litigation in Mohamed ties back to
proceedings in the United States. In May 2008, the United States
44
charged Mohamed under the Military Commissions Act with
45
conspiracy to commit terrorism, relying on confessions that
46
Mohamed alleged were elicited under the threat of torture.
Mohamed began proceedings in English courts, seeking release of
evidence in the possession of the British government that the
United States had compiled against Mohamed. In August 2008, a
court ruled in Mohamed’s favor, concluding that Mohamed’s
allegations of torture were substantiated and that he had a right to
47
evidence that supported his claim. As part of its ruling, the court
summarized evidence gleaned from U.S. intelligence sources, but
redacted that summary after the Foreign Secretary issued a public
interest immunity certificate claiming that state secrets were at issue
48
in Mohamed’s suit.
The Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division
reconsidered in early 2009 whether the public interest immunity
certificate issued by the Foreign Secretary was compelling such that
the previously redacted summary with evidence of Mohamed’s
49
The
treatment could not be given to Mohamed’s attorneys.
public interest immunity certificate asserted that the summary
report must remain undisclosed because the U.S government had

44. 10 U.S.C. §§ 948–50 (2006).
45. This proceeding was later dropped, as the convening judge determined
the prosecution could not proceed without the use of evidence obtained through
torture. See William Glaberson, U.S. Drops Charges for 5 Guantánamo Detainees, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/22/washington/22gitmo
.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1328130327-WTFkFvw3ue0Rn9QlvAuLHQ.
46. Mohamed v. Sec’y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [2008]
EWHC (Admin) 2048, [38]–[47] (Eng.).
47. Id. at [105].
48. Id. at [150]–[160].
49. The court noted that the information in question was “seven very short
paragraphs amounting to about 25 lines” of text which summarized reports by the
U.S. government to British intelligence services on the treatment of Mohamed
during his detention in Pakistan. See Mohamed v. Sec’y of State for Foreign &
Commonwealth Affairs, [2009] EWHC (Admin) 152, [14] (Eng.).
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threatened to “re-evaluate its intelligence sharing relationship with
the United Kingdom” and possibly withhold vital national security
information from the United Kingdom should the summary be
50
disclosed to Mohamed’s attorneys.
The English court laid out the test for balancing the public
interest in national security and the public interest in “open justice,
51
the rule of law and democratic accountability.” The test involved
balancing the public interest in disclosure of the information and
the possibility of serious harm to a public interest, such as national
security, if disclosure is made, and determining whether national
security interests can be protected by means other than
52
In theory, its analysis is not unlike that of the
nondisclosure.
Ninth Circuit en banc majority in Mohamed. The application of this
analysis, however, and the recognition of the importance of the
detrimental effects of upholding the privilege differ significantly.
The English court took pains to detail all of the reasons that
53
disclosure was desirable, including upholding the rule of law,
54
comporting with international and supranational standards,
ensuring that allegations of serious criminality are not dismissed
55
inappropriately, maintaining accountability over the executive
56
branch of government, and protecting the public and media
57
The court also
interest in disclosure of government activities.
appeared surprised that the U.S. government was apparently
interfering in a matter of government accountability in another
country, taking pains to note:
[I]n light of the long history of the common law and
democracy which we share with the United States, it was,
in our view difficult to conceive that a democratically
50. Id. at [62]; see Glenn Greenwald, Obama Administration Threatens Britain to
Keep Torture Evidence Concealed, SALON.COM (May 12, 2009, 9:36 AM),
http://www.salon.com/2009/05/12/obama_101.
51. Mohamed, [2009] EWHC (Admin) 152, [18] (Eng.) (noting that this case
revolved around a question of the rule of law, not around the rights of an
individual litigant).
52. Id. at [34] (citing Regina v. H, [2004] 2 A.C. 134 (H.L.) [36(3)] (Eng.)).
53. Mohamed, [2009] EWHC (Admin) 152, [18]–[19] (Eng.).
54. See id. at [20]–[21], [26], [30], [101]–[105].
55. Id. at [26(iv)], [26(ix)].
56. Id. at [32].
57. Id. at [37] (“Where there is no publicity there is no justice. . . . There is
no greater danger of usurpation than that which proceeds little by little, under
cover of rules of procedure, and at the instance of judges themselves.” (quoting
Scott v. Scott, [1913] A.C. 417 (H.L.) 477 (Lord Shaw of Dunfermline) (appeal
taken from EWCA (Civ)) (U.K.)).
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elected and accountable government could possibly have
any rational objection to placing into the public domain
such a summary of what its own officials reported as to
how a detainee was treated by them and which made no
disclosure of sensitive intelligence matters. Indeed we did
not consider that a democracy governed by the rule of law
would expect a court in another democracy to suppress a
summary of the evidence . . . where the evidence was
relevant to allegations of torture and cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment, politically embarrassing though it
58
might be.
Despite the strong language regarding the rule of law and
government transparency, when the court applied the test, it relied
heavily on its long-standing precedent of offering deference to the
59
executive branch in matters of national security, found that the
Foreign Secretary acted in good faith in issuing the public interest
60
immunity certificate, opined that an opportunity for government
accountability may still exist with ongoing investigations within the
61
United Kingdom into Mohamed’s allegations, and decided that
there was no basis on which it could question the Foreign
62
Secretary’s issuance of the public interest immunity certificate.
At this point, the analysis of the Ninth Circuit en banc decision
and the Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench appear at least
superficially consistent. Although the Divisional Court undertakes
a more rigorous balancing test, both courts act with extreme
deference and ultimately dismiss plaintiffs’ claims despite concerns
regarding the rule of law, human rights, and accountability.
However, the English court reconsidered its own decision
58. Id. at [69].
59. See id. at [63]–[67]. However, the court noted that such deference
needed to be limited to instances of genuine national security, and not cases in
which “it appears that while disclosure of the material may cause embarrassment
or arouse criticism, it will not damage any security or intelligence interest . . . .” Id.
at [66] (quoting R. v. Shayler, [2003] A.C. 247 (H.L.) 272 (Lord Bingham of
Cornhill) (appeal taken from EWCA (Crim)) (U.K.)).
60. Id. at [62]–[63], [76]–[79] (noting that the Foreign Secretary perceived
the U.S. threat to be real, and that if the threat were carried out, U.K. national
security interests would be seriously prejudiced); see Ministers Face Torture Pressure,
BBC NEWS (Feb. 4, 2009, 20:53 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news
/politics/7870049.stm (noting that Foreign Secretary David Miliband denied that
the United States made a threat; Miliband instead stated that the U.S.-U.K. security
relationship was based on trust and that trust depended on intelligence remaining
confidential).
61. Mohamed, [2009] EWHC (Admin) 152, [102], [104]–[105] (Eng.).
62. Id. at [79].
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based on its conclusion that it would have been a grave injustice to
let the matter die because of U.S. executive branch pressures. The
court reopened its ruling on public interest immunity and, in
October 2009, reversed its previous decision to withhold the
information regarding Mohamed’s treatment by the U.S.
63
government. The court reasoned that there was an extremely low
likelihood that the Obama Administration would actually withhold
important intelligence from the U.K. government under these
64
circumstances and noted that “a vital public interest requires, for
reasons of democratic accountability and the rule of law in the
United Kingdom, that a summary of the most important evidence
relating to the involvement of the British security services in
wrongdoing be placed in the public domain in the United
65
Kingdom.”
The October 2009 decision in the Mohamed case reflects both
the strength of English precedent that mandates a high level of
deference to the government in matters related to public interest
immunity and the hard questions that courts must face in applying
that deferential standard when doing so implicates the rule of law,
individual rights, and government accountability in matters of
66
The opinion
serious allegations of human rights abuses.
ultimately rejected formalistic reasoning about the process in place
that would necessarily lead to deference to the executive in favor of
maintaining the rule of law, “open justice,” and the possibility of
public accountability for whatever role the U.K. government had in
67
maltreating Mohamed.
In February 2010, the English Court of Appeal considered the
Foreign Secretary’s argument that government information that
involved intelligence from the United States ought not to be

63. Mohamed v. Sec’y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [2009]
EWHC (Admin) 2653, [7] (Eng.) (noting that reopening of a case should be done
in “exceptional circumstances” if necessary in the “interests of justice”).
64. Id. at [39], [49], [69vi], [104]. The court noted that the objections made
by the Obama Administration to disclosing the information in question were not
as strong as the threats made by the Bush Administration. Id.
65. Id. at [105].
66. See KENT ROACH, THE 9/11 EFFECT: COMPARATIVE COUNTER-TERRORISM
223–24 (2011) (addressing the different attitudes of U.S. and U.K. courts in the
Mohamed litigation).
67. See Steven D. Schwinn, State Secrets, Open Justice, and the Criss-Crossing
Evolution of Privilege in the United States and the United Kingdom, 29 L’OBSERVATEUR
DES NATIONS UNIES 171, 186 (2011) (discussing open justice principles).
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68

disclosed. It upheld the Divisional Court’s decision, reiterating
open justice principles that provide for both procedural and
substantive justice. Bolstering the reasoning of the lower court with
regard to these principles, the Court of Appeal took notice not just
of the formal process of how to consider public interest immunity,
but also the veracity of Mohamed’s claims and the need for the
court to hold in a way that maintained fairness in the
69
proceedings.
Specifically, the appellate decision looked to dicta in the U.S.
70
habeas corpus matter of Mohammed v. Obama. In that case, Judge
Kessler of the D.C. District Court weighed the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus from detainee Farhi Saeed bin Mohammed and
considered evidence proffered by the government that Binyam
Mohamed, while in detention at Guantanamo Bay, told the
government that bin Mohammed had trained with him at an al
71
Qaeda base. Judge Kessler described at length and in much detail
the harrowing detention and torture of Binyam Mohamed while in
United States custody; based on the duration and severity of his
mistreatment, she held that his testimony with regard to bin
72
She
Mohammed was unreliable and, therefore, inadmissible.
further noted that “[t]he Government does not challenge or deny
73
the accuracy of Binyam Mohamed’s story of brutal treatment.”
The English Court of Appeal took close notice of the
acceptance by Judge Kessler of the veracity of Binyam Mohamed’s
claims regarding his treatment and used this revelation as one of
the bases for reaffirming its open justice principles and upholding
the order for the U.K. government to disclose information
74
This willingness of the
regarding Mohamed’s mistreatment.

68. Mohamed v. Sec’y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [2010]
EWCA (Civ) 158, [2011] Q.B. 218 (Eng.).
69. See Adam Tomkins, National Security and the Due Process of Law, 64 CURRENT
LEGAL PROBLEMS 215, 229 (2011) (noting that the fact that Mohamed’s case
involved allegations of horrific torture weighed significantly in the court’s
decision-making regarding the public interest immunity question).
70. 704 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009). This citation refers to the declassified
opinion that was made publicly available on December 16, 2009. The original
version of the opinion, dated November 19, 2009, is cited at Mohammed v. Obama,
689 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2009).
71. Mohammed, 704 F. Supp 2d. at 2, 18–19.
72. Id. at 20–23, 29.
73. Id. at 24.
74. Mohamed v. Sec’y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
[2010] EWCA (Civ) 65 [138], [2011] Q.B. 218 (Eng.).
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English Court of Appeal to take notice of a U.S. federal court
decision in which relevant facts were discussed and engage in a
realist analysis serves as a sharp contrast to the Ninth Circuit en
banc decision in Mohamed, where the majority does not appear to
concern itself with evidence of the veracity of Mohamed’s claims,
does not take note of Judge Kessler’s opinion—even though it had
been brought to the court’s attention—and instead limits itself to
an overly formalistic interpretation of the state secrets privilege that
75
fails to address human rights concerns in a meaningful way.
B. Israel
Israeli courts, like their English counterparts, offer an example
of how the courts balance imperatives of security with the rule of
law when they refuse to accept a narrow interpretation of their own
role. In Israel, the analysis of a state secrets-type claim turns on two
questions: whether the case is justiciable, and, if so, how to evaluate
potentially sensitive evidence that relates to national security
76
matters. Analysis of both of these questions is undertaken using a
flexible, realist approach to decision-making that accounts for the
government’s interest and, more importantly, gives significant
weight to plaintiffs’ allegations that human rights have been
violated. This type of approach and the mindset of the Israeli
courts reflect similar attitudes to the English reasoning in the
Mohamed case.
In Israel, almost any complaint against the executive branch is
77
The Israeli Supreme Court “dismantled
considered justiciable.
various doctrinal barriers to judicial review in the 1990s, such as
75. In fact, the only reference to Judge Kessler’s decision comes in a footnote
referencing the Mohammed case, in which the court notes that Binyam Mohamed’s
allegations have been discussed elsewhere. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan,
Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1074 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010).
76. Israel’s Evidence Act includes provisions on how courts should consider
government assertions of a privilege surrounding sensitive information that, in
many respects, mirror the structure used in England and the United States. See
Evidence Ordinance (New Version), 5731-1971, 2 LSI 198, §§ 44–46 (1968–1972)
(Isr.). However, the Israeli Supreme Court’s analysis with regard to the invocation
of the privilege as a matter of justiciability depends on constitutional and common
law sources that are separate from the Evidence Act.
77. Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a
Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 153 (2002) (“Our Supreme Court—which in
Israel serves as the court of first instance for complaints against the executive
branch—opens its doors to anyone with a complaint about the activities of a public
authority.”).
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standing and justiciability,” in order to facilitate more private
78
Even with an extremely broad grant of standing—
actions.
particularly by U.S. standards—Israeli courts undertake a balancing
analysis to determine whether national-security-related litigation
ought to continue or be dismissed as non-justiciable. Although
justiciability is no guarantee of ultimate success in litigation against
the government, this layer of procedural protection reflects a
willingness of the courts to step away from formulaic and
formalistic decision-making and is particularly remarkable given
79
the national security climate and political pressures in Israel.
One illustrative case is Public Committee Against Torture in Israel
80
v. Israel, in which the central issue was whether preventative strikes
undertaken by the Israeli military in response to alleged terrorist
attacks were illegal. The plaintiffs challenged the practices of the
military based on the loss of civilian life in the strikes and Israel’s
obligations under international treaties and international
customary law. However, before reaching a conclusion as to the
merits of the case, the court considered a challenge by the
government that the suit was not justiciable based on national
81
security concerns.
The Israeli Supreme Court considered the broad Israeli
82
and applied a four-pronged test to
justiciability doctrine
78. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Checks and Balances in Wartime: American, British and
Israeli Experiences, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1906, 1923 (2004). Schulhofer also notes that
Israeli government and military leaders seem to accept the judicial safeguards that
have been put into place to modify the conduct of the administration. Id. at 1931.
79. See, e.g., HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel 5 ¶ 10,
9–10 ¶ 16, 33 ¶ 47 [2005] (Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng
/02/690/007/A34/02007690.a34.pdf (“Between Israel and the various terrorist
organizations . . . a continuous situation of armed conflict has existed since the
first intifada.”); HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel 4 ¶ 1
[1999] (Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/94/000/051/a09
/94051000.a09.pdf (“The State of Israel has been engaged in an unceasing
struggle for both its security—indeed, its very existence.”); Schulhofer, supra note
78, at 1918–19 (describing the security risks faced by Israel since its founding).
80. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel [2005] (Isr.),
available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/A34/02007690.a34
.pdf.
81. Id. at 5 ¶ 9 (arguing against justiciability, the government cites Israeli
High Court of Justice precedent, HCJ 5872/01 Barakeh v. Prime Minister 56(3)
[2002] (Isr.), for the proposition that “the choice of means of war employed by
[the government] in order to prevent murderous terrorist attacks before they
happen, is not among the subjects in which this Court will see fit to intervene”).
82. The Court considered two strands of Israeli justiciability doctrine—
normative and institutional. For a fuller discussion, see Setty, supra note 6, at 246.
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determine whether this was an issue in which the court should
involve itself. The Israeli Supreme Court reasoned that a case
83
involving the impingement of human rights is always justiciable;
that a case in which the central issue is one of political or military
84
policy and not a legal dispute is not justiciable; that an issue that
has already been decided by international courts and tribunals to
which Israel is a signatory must be justiciable in Israel’s domestic
courts; and that judicial review is most appropriate in an ex post
85
situation.
When the first and second prongs of the justiciability analysis
come into conflict in a particular situation, courts undertake a
proportionality analysis, which, by its very nature, involves the court
stepping away from a rigid approach and adopting a flexible view
86
Applying these
to determine whether a suit should continue.
criteria to the situation at hand, the Israeli Supreme Court found
that the claims were clearly justiciable and that the plaintiffs’ suit
87
Ultimately, the Israeli Supreme Court
could go forward.
concluded that the targeted killings at issue in the case were not
per se illegal, but that they must be evaluated on an individual
basis—again reflecting the court’s priority in retaining a flexible
analysis in evaluating the best course of action when balancing the
imperatives of security, transparency, accountability, and the rule of
88
law.
Israeli courts have consistently been involved in weighing
national security interests against human rights concerns and have
83. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel 34–35 ¶ 50
[2005] (Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/A34
/02007690.a34.pdf (citing HCJ 606/78 Oyeb v. Minister of Def. 33(2) IsrSC 113,
124 [1978] (Isr.)).
84. Id. at 35 ¶ 51 (citing HCJ 4481/91 Bargil v. Israel 37(4) IsrSC 210, 218
[1993] (Isr.)).
85. Id. at 36 ¶¶ 53–54.
86. Id. at 38 ¶ 58.
Between these two ends of the spectrum, there are intermediate
situations. Each of them requires a meticulous examination of the
character of the decision. To the extent that it has a legal aspect, it
approaches the one end of the spectrum. To the extent that it has a
professional military aspect, it approaches the other end of the spectrum.
Id.
87. Id. at 1–2 ¶¶ 1–3.
88. Id. at 41–42 ¶ 63. This decision is particularly notable given the recent
U.S. decision dismissing a suit challenging the U.S. targeted killing program. See
Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing, based on
standing grounds, the suit of Nasser al-Aulaqi to enjoin the U.S. government from
keeping his son, U.S. citizen Anwar al-Aulaqi, on its targeted killing list).
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developed a sophisticated analysis to do so. Like their English
counterparts, they appear to view the rule of law as demanding that
the courts assert themselves in security matters despite hesitations
based on security imperatives or historical deference. Justice
Procaccia, in Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v.
Minister of the Interior, explained the rule of law approach that
underpins the thinking of Israeli courts:
The “security need” argument made by the state has no
magical power such that once raised it must be accepted
without inquiry and investigation . . . . Admittedly, as a
rule, the court is cautious in examining the security
considerations of the authorities and it does not intervene
in them lightly.
Notwithstanding, where the
implementation of a security policy involves a violation of
human rights, the court should examine the
reasonableness of the considerations of the authorities
and the proportionality of the measures that they wish to
89
implement.
C. India
If England and Israel illustrate the ability of courts to utilize a
rule of law analysis regarding secret information and justiciability,
India represents a hard line of formalism that the United States is
at risk of veering toward.
Historically, Indian courts have granted the utmost deference
to the executive branch as to when national security policy should
90
be disclosed. When cases raise issues of individual rights being
compromised by government secrecy, courts undertake a balancing
test to determine whether the public interest or individual rights at
stake should override executive secrecy; however, government
claims regarding the necessity of secrecy, as in the U.S. state secrets
91
privilege cases in the post-9/11 context, consistently prevail.
89. HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Ctr. for Arab Minority Rights in Isr. v. Minister
of Interior 260 ¶ 10 [2006] (Isr.) (citing Ajuri v. IDF Commander in the W. Bank
[1], 375–76; HCJ 9070/00 Livnat v. Chairman of Constitution, Law & Justice
Comm. 810), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/03/520/070/a47
/03070520.a47.pdf.
90. E.g., State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 865 (India)
(carving out national security as the area in which the Prime Minister can
unilaterally decide what information to disclose); see Satish & Chandra, supra note
10, at 65 (describing the history of Indian courts deferring to executive decisions
regarding security matters).
91. E.g., People’s Union for Civil Liberties & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.,
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Deference to executive branch decision-making is deeply
92
rooted in national-security-related cases and is consistent with
India’s history of granting the executive branch sole power to
determine whether to disclose information in any number of
contexts, including enforcement of its Official Secrets Act, a legacy
93
of British colonial rule in India. Courts consistently discuss the
need for government accountability and transparency, but
ultimately revert to a formalist analysis that defers to an executive
branch claim for nondisclosure in the name of public interest.
94
The case of Dinesh Trivedi v. Union of India exemplifies the
type of reasoning that the Indian Supreme Court often relies upon
to uphold government secrecy claims. In Trivedi, the Indian
Supreme Court considered whether to order the publication of
background documents underlying a commissioned report on
government corruption, which the government had withheld based
on a claim of needed secrecy. Members of Parliament, including
(2004) 2 S.C.C. 476 (India) (upholding denial of request for disclosure of
information).
92. This deference has been consistent, despite the adoption of right-toinformation legislation in recent years and judicial statements about the
importance of government transparency. Freedom of Information Act, No. 5 of
2003, INDIA CODE (2009), available at http://indiacode.nic.in; e.g., S.P. Gupta v.
President of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 234, ¶ 66 (India) (“The concept of an open
government is the direct emanation from the right to know which seems to be
implicit in the right of free speech and expression guaranteed under Article
19(1)(a) [of the Indian Constitution]. Therefore, disclosure of information in
regard to the functioning of Government must be the rule and secrecy an
exception justified only where the strictest requirement of public interest so
demands.”); see also Country Passing Through Transparency Revolution: Antony, UNITED
NEWS OF INDIA, June 8, 2011 (quoting Defense Minister A.K. Antony as hailing the
advent of a “transparency revolution” in which the “walls of secrecy were
crumbling”).
93. India operates under the edicts of the Official Secrets Act, No. 19 of 1923,
INDIA CODE (2009), available at http://indiacode.nic.in, enforced in India by the
British colonial government. Under the Official Secrets Act (OSA), any disclosure
of information—intentional or inadvertent—likely to affect the sovereignty,
integrity, or security of India is punishable by imprisonment for up to fourteen
years. Although similar provisions of the Official Secrets Act were removed in
England in 1989, the provisions of the 1923 Act remain in effect in India, despite
criticism of its application. See Sarbari Sinha, Official Secrets and a Frame-Up,
FRONTLINE, May 7, 2005, available at http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2210
/stories/20050520000607400.htm (addressing how revocation of the Official
Secrets Act would curb potential abuses of police powers).
94. Dinesh Trivedi v. Union of India, (1997) 4 S.C.C. 306 (India). The Court
in Trivedi relies heavily on the balancing test articulated in S.P. Gupta, A.I.R. 1982
S.C. 234, to find that government secrecy claims ought to be upheld despite rule
of law concerns.
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petitioner Dinesh Trivedi, alleged that the Home Minister refused
95
disclosure to avoid government embarrassment. In response, the
Home Secretary submitted an affidavit affirming the accuracy of a
publicly distributed summary report, but claiming that additional
96
documents could not be disclosed as a matter of public interest.
The Indian Supreme Court’s response is emblematic of the
reflexively deferential and overly formalistic reasoning in matters of
national security and government secrecy. The Indian Supreme
Court begins with familiar language about the necessity of
transparency to curb government abuse and uphold the rule of law,
noting that, “Sunlight is the best disinfectant. But it is equally
97
important to be alive to the dangers that lie ahead.” The Indian
Supreme Court accepts with little question the government’s
assertion that publication of the report may be injurious to the
public interest and goes further to hypothesize that the public
furor toward individuals named in the report—should it be
published in full—could lead to harassment and violence. Based
on its own speculative concerns that appear grounded in historical
deference to executive decision-making, the court held that
publication of the full report and its underlying documents was
98
unwarranted.
This pattern of acknowledging the policy and rights concerns
underlying a case, but ultimately siding with the government’s
position with little investigation into the veracity of the
99
government’s claims, has played out in other secrecy-related cases.
In doing so, the Indian Supreme Court has opined that its
deference to government secrecy claims is bolstered by its
100
In
consistency with English cases on public interest immunity.
95. Trivedi, 4 S.C.C. 306, ¶¶ 6, 8.
96. Id. ¶¶ 9–10.
97. Id. ¶ 19.
98. Id. ¶¶ 16–20.
99. E.g., People’s Union for Civil Liberties & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.,
(2004) 2 S.C.C. 476 (India). The Court in this case upheld the government’s
secrecy claim over a report on nuclear reactors, reasoning that that secrecy was
sometimes necessary because “[i]f every action taken by the political or executive
functionary is transformed into a public controversy and made subject to an
enquiry to soothe popular sentiments, it will undoubtedly have a chilling effect on
the independence of the decision-maker.” See id. (the Right of Information
section).
100. See id. (the Criteria for Determining the Question of Privilege section,
holding that “the foundation of the law behind Sections 123 and 162 of the
Evidence Act is the same as in English law. It is that injury to public interest is the
reason for the exclusion from disclosure of documents whose contents if disclosed
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one case, this deference manifested itself in the Indian Supreme
Court declining review of documents over which the government
claimed secrecy even after the government had proffered
101
The level of deference offered
submission for in camera review.
by the Indian Supreme Court is higher than that of any of the
other nations surveyed here, but is arguably more consistent with
the recent state secrets cases in the United States than that of the
102
English courts in the Mohamed litigation.
The failure of the Indian Supreme Court to engage in a more
meaningful analysis of rights claims in the secrecy and security
contexts is unsurprising. In crafting counterterrorism legislation,
Parliament has responded to public pressure and arguable
103
constitutional priorities in prioritizing robust security measures
104
over protection of individual rights. The Indian Supreme Court,
consistent with its security-related jurisprudence, has little appetite
for putting itself in a countermajoritarian role and instead has
consistently reverted to a formalistic analysis that offers a rhetorical
nod to the rule of law and individual rights, but no substantive
105
relief to those who seek to chip away at government secrecy.
V. CONCLUSION
Current trends in U.S. state secrets jurisprudence offer two
related insights. First, U.S. courts in the post-9/11 context are
would injure public and national interest”) (citing Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain,
A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 865 (India)).
101. See id. (the Conclusion section).
102. There is no indication that the adoption of a right to information statute
in 2005 has substantially affected the reasoning of the courts with regard to
security-related secrecy, particularly since the statute contains a carve-out for
national security matters. See The Right to Information Act, No. 22 of 2005, INDIA
CODE (2009), available at http://indiacode.nic.in.
103. See SHYLASHRI SHANKAR, SCALING JUSTICE: INDIA’S SUPREME COURT, ANTITERROR LAWS, AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 61–71, 90–91 (2009) (arguing that whereas social
rights is considered an area in which the judiciary is expected to take an active
role, security and secrecy are areas in which the constitutional framers and
Parliament have purposefully curtailed the judiciary’s ability to curb executive
power).
104. See Sudha Setty, What’s in a Name: How Nations Define Terrorism Ten Years
After 9/11, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 46–54 (2011) (detailing the history of Indian
counterterrorism legislation and the court’s validation of legislation that has been
abused to violate civil rights and liberties).
105. See Satish & Chandra, supra note 10, at 73 (critiquing the Indian Supreme
Court’s terrorism jurisprudence for focusing on procedural and technical
questions and abdicating its role as a protector of fundamental rights).
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shifting toward a formalized approach to the privilege that is, in
some respects, reminiscent of Indian jurisprudence—formal
acknowledgement of rule of law imperatives, but ultimately
deciding that the judiciary’s role is not to stake a position contrary
to the executive branch, resulting in a consistent lack of relief for
individual litigants. In India, this dynamic has been reflected in
national-security-related cases for some time; the context of
challenging secrecy designations may be relatively new, but the
reasoning of the courts and the ultimate result is the same. In the
United States, the state secrets cases illustrate what may be
becoming the new normal in security-related jurisprudence:
formalistic reasoning that allows the court to bow out of its
countermajoritarian role of protecting individual rights and justice.
Certainly the approach taken by India and the United States is not
the only viable one—England and Israel are evidence of that.
Second, the Mohamed case illustrates that England’s current
application of the state secrets privilege—however historically
deferential—reflects at least in some cases the prioritization of
various rule of law principles by the English courts, including the
need for open justice, government accountability, and the
opportunity for redress by individual litigants. The flexible
approach used by the English court to determine that secrecy
ought not prevail in the Mohamed case is reassuring to those
concerned with rights protection. Yet the larger specter of the
United States exerting pressure regarding the state secrets privilege
serves as a warning that even though the United States was not
106
successful with regard to applying pressure on England, given
U.S. soft power around the world, it may be successful in other

106. The U.S. government’s displeasure with the English treatment of Binyam
Mohamed’s case has, however, motivated the British government to propose the
stripping of judicial review over similar cases in which sensitive information may be
disclosed. See SECRETARY OF STATE FOR JUSTICE, JUSTICE AND SECURITY GREEN PAPER,
2011, Cm. 8194, ¶ 2.91 (U.K.), available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011
/oct/uk-justice-and-security-green-paper.pdf. The Green Paper notes that such
measures are necessary because “[s]ince Binyam Mohamed, the Government and its
foreign government partners have less confidence than before that the courts will
accept the view of Ministers on the harm to national security that would result
from disclosure.” Id. at ¶ 1.43; cf. ADAM TOMKINS & TOM HICKMAN, BINGHAM
CENTRE FOR THE RULE OF LAW, RESPONSE TO THE JUSTICE AND SECURITY GREEN PAPER
¶¶ 66–70 (Jan. 6, 2012), available at www.biicl.org/files/5829_bingham_centre
_response_to_green_paper.pdf (arguing that the Green Paper’s proposal to strip
judicial review of such cases is based on misconceptions, is unjustified, and would
undermine the rule of law).
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nations where courts would otherwise apply a narrower privilege.
As it stands, there is no incentive for any administration—
Democratic or Republican—to curtail its own power with regard to
the state secrets privilege. The 2009 Holder Memorandum adds
layers of intra-executive oversight that have yielded little in terms of
increasing government transparency or furthering rule of law
107
That leaves Congress and the courts to act.
principles.
Congressional apathy on this issue has been clear; although useful
108
and thoughtful legislation on this issue has been proposed twice,
it has not been passed, and there is no apparent political
motivation or will for Congress to take up state secrets reform now.
When Mohamed filed his U.S. suit seeking redress for human
rights violations allegedly suffered from rendition and torture, it
was understood that the executive branch would invoke the state
secrets privilege and that Congress had not offered guidance on
applying the privilege. Instead of acknowledging this reality and
embracing the unique ability and obligation of the courts to
balance security interests with the grave human rights concerns at
issue, the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc employed formalistic,
deferential, and altogether unsatisfactory reasoning to suggest that
the judiciary must defer to the executive. The abdication of the
judiciary’s responsibility in the name of executive branch secrecy
concerns is all the more striking when contrasted with the
reasoning of courts in England and Israel. Modern state secrets
jurisprudence in these two nations ought to counsel the courts
toward a rule-of-law-oriented approach to future litigation in this
area.
Passage of strong state secrets reform legislation should
remain a priority to ensure an external, long-term check on
109
In the meantime, courts should
executive branch overreaching.
107. See Christina E. Wells, State Secrets and Executive Accountability, 26 CONST.
COMMENT. 625, 643–46 (2010) (discussing the limits of intra-executive review of
secrecy decisions). Wells further observes that if “nothing in the Obama [state
secrets] policy or subsequent actions suggests that the Administration will hold
itself accountable, courts’ inconsistency in applying the [state secrets] privilege
presents further problems.” Id. at 648.
108. See Setty, supra note 6, at 255–59 (discussing potential benefits of the
proposed state secrets reforms and suggesting additional reform measures).
109. Legislative inertia and a high level of deference to executive branch
decision-making have hobbled many avenues for genuine legislative oversight or
any kind of substantial reform efforts with regard to national security and the rule
of law. See, e.g., Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum,
1 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 455, 464–66 (2005) (discussing inaccuracies in the
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heed the lessons of nations like England and Israel in not being
cowed by assertions that judicial involvement in security matters is
110
Instead,
unwarranted or undermines the safety of the nation.
courts must take on the responsibility of offering a realistic
opportunity for redress for those alleging grave violations of civil
rights and civil liberties, even—and perhaps especially—during
times of war.

Office of Legal Counsel Torture Memorandum and the ethical implications);
Peter Margulies, True Believers at Law: National Security Agendas, the Regulation of
Lawyers, and the Separation of Powers, 68 MD. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2005) (critiquing
torture memos from the Office of Legal Counsel and suggesting comprehensive
regime change). Arguments that this deference is unwarranted continue to grow.
E.g., Rana, supra note 41; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Secrecy and Democracy: Who Controls
Information in the National Security State? (NYU Sch. of Law, Pub. Law Research
Paper No. 10–53), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1661964.
110. Such assertions are commonly levied by the executive branch, but are
sometimes offered by the judiciary itself. E.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723,
802 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (critiquing the level of judicial involvement
in detention decisions endorsed by the Court and noting that, “[a]ll that today’s
opinion has done is shift responsibility for those sensitive foreign policy and
national security decisions from the elected branches to the Federal Judiciary”); id.
at 827–28 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that “no basis for judicial intervention”
existed here, and that such intervention “will almost certainly cause more
Americans to be killed”).

